By Edward Erwin
More than a century has handed considering the fact that Sigmund Freud all started his groundbreaking paintings in psychoanalysis but there isn't any consensus approximately his legacy; as an alternative there's power war of words not just approximately Freud's popularity and position in historical past yet concerning the right criteria to exploit in comparing his concept and therapy.
This publication develops epistemological criteria for Freudian psychology and offers a finished assessment of, and probably ultimate, verdict on Freud's idea and treatment. not like the other assessment released to this point, it encompasses a systematic dialogue of either the Freudian experimental and non-experimental proof and the correct criteria for examining the evidence.
Part I considers the view that Freud's conception could be judged by means of exact evidential criteria deemed applicable for judging hypotheses of common-sense psychology. Edward Erwin argues in contrast view and for the employment of criteria acceptable to causal hypotheses of either the average and social sciences. Erwin additionally addresses different concerns approximately criteria equivalent to the necessity for experimental proof, using placebo controls, the correct pursuits of psychotherapy, and using meta-analysis in reading consequence data.
The criteria built partly I of the booklet are utilized in half II in comparing the easiest on hand Freudian evidence.
A Bradford Book
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Additional info for A Final Accounting: Philosophical and Empirical Issues in Freudian Psychology
Nagel’s response (1994b) is to explain “intuitive credibility” in a way that distinguishes his evidential standard from Taylor’s: The fundamental causal principle of commonsense psychology is that in most cases, you can discover causally relevant conditions (conditions that make a difference in precisely Grünbaum’s sense) for a human action or thought or emotion by ªtting it into a rationally coherent interpretation of the whole of the person as an intentional subject of this type—by seeing how from the person’s point of view it is in some way justiªed.
Whether the pattern is valid depends on the interpretation of “could derive” in the second premise. If Kettner means “could possibly derive,” then the conclusion fails to follow. , resulted from) her unconscious identiªcation with her pupils, but the features may also have resulted from her conscious sympathy for the students. Indeed, many causes are logically possible. Kettner’s premises fail to guarantee that it is reasonable to believe that any particular one was causally relevant. What Kettner may mean, however, is that the features could plausibly be said to derive from M (see Kettner, 1991, 165, his discussion of the role of background conditions in sifting out unreasonably “abduced” explanations).
Nagel, however, is not defending what might be called “an empirical extension” of common sense. He points out (1994a, 34) that Freud took the familiar idea that people are often unaware of their true motives, but carried it so far that he could not defend it just by appealing to common sense. What Nagel has in mind is a methodological extension of common sense. Commonsense explanations, he contends, provide a distinctive form of understanding from within (1994a, 34), and they are evaluated by a distinctive standard, one not appropriate for particle physics, cancer research, or the study of reºexes (35).
A Final Accounting: Philosophical and Empirical Issues in Freudian Psychology by Edward Erwin